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Ineta Kivle
Aristotle’s Concept of Friendship and Plato’s Structure of Human Soul
ABSTRACT: The present study analyses Aristotle’s concept of friendship in comparison 
with Plato’s structure of human soul (psyche) where friendship and soul are concerned 
with proper virtue, harmony and justice, and shows kinds of friendship of Aristotle’s 
ethics in connection with Derrida’s interpretation of political friendship. The current 
study views cognitions of Aristotle and Plato from several points of view:
Aristotle’s characterization of friendship as “a single soul dwelling in two bodies” 
shows correlations between utility that is directed to utility, pleasure that is directed to 
pleasure, good that is directed to goodness. On the basis of these correlations Aristotle 
develops three main kinds of friendship in society: a) in friendship of utility people 
derive benefit from each other and such communication can develop between opposite 
people; b) in friendship of pleasure friends are motivated by their own pleasure; c) in 
friendship of goodness friends enjoy each other’s virtues and help one another reach 
goodness. The third is friendship based on goodness, where both people admire the 
other’s goodness and help one another strive for goodness. Plato’s division of human 
soul (psyche) into rational, spiritual and appetitive shows how the determinative part 
of the soul forms qualities of human lives, the value of definite actions and adherence 
to the proper part of society: a) the appetitive component of soul represents a myriad 
desires for various pleasures and physical satisfactions; b) the spiritual component of 
soul loves victory, challenges, winning and honour; c) the rational component of soul 
thinks and measures what is the best and truest overall. Comparing Aristotle’s kinds 
of friendship and Plato’s components of psyche we see that in friendship of utility and 
pleasure the appetite and tendency to victory and sensuality are essential, however, 
friendship that is directed to goodness and activities of rational component of soul 
is characterised by wise life, justice and harmony. The subject matter of the study 
is concerned with the above-mentioned philosophical standpoints and confirms the 
following: interconnectedness of individual and social; correlations between harmony 
of soul and justice in society; connectedness of rational action and wise life. The study 
shows kinds of friendship in Aristotle’s ethics in connection with Derrida’s interpretation 
of political friendship. These well-known cognitions obtain different modifications and 
interpretations and give ground for mutual understanding of communicative processes 
in the current society.
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Ancient philosophy shows that friendship justifies conformity between two or 
more congenial souls that can be called understanding of each other. True friendship
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is directed to others - it opens uniqueness of human’s activities and souls. Aristotle 
sees friendship as development of character, in which relations between friends make 
critical interdependence. Such virtues as justice and goodness are reached by education 
and choice of the right medium - the right choice encourages virtue and develops good 
life where the main end and function of life determine human activity and virtue. Plato’s 
view on soul concerns the notion of justice in several modifications - inner justice 
between parts of soul encourages virtue and gives guarantee for harmonic relations; 
justice in society is grounded on acceptance of a dominant part of soul of any citizen 
and gives guarantee for good order in the state. Derrida refers to cognitions of Plato and 
Aristotle and shows consequences of political friendship.
1.Structure of Soul and Kinds of Friendship
Soul has different kinds of activities - from transcendental to limited - soul is between 
unchanging forms and various particulars. In the context of friendship the notion of 
soul concerns human nature and life. Three parts of soul - appetitive, spiritual and 
rational - determine human activity and organize the dynamic composition of human’s 
life where one of the parts is dominant: the appetitive part includes desires of pleasure 
and comfort, these appetites can be in conflict with each other; the spiritual part of the 
soul is full of power and energy; the rational part of soul thinks and maintains balance 
between all the parts of soul, takes the moral implications and represents true self that 
connects forms and particulars, transcendental and limited. Particulars (desire, emotion, 
perception and reason) develop in relations with activities of human - soul is altered by 
the life it lives. Soul becomes bearer of such moral qualities as temperance and justice 
that are the highest virtues and harmony of human soul, soul is also responsible for 
practical activities and cognitions.
How to reach justice in friendship? Plato’s solution is that justice is an educated 
quality - for realization of justice it is necessary to know the role and meaning of one’s 
own epitedeuma - natural aptitude. Justice is good in itself as well as justice has its 
own particular consequences - the life of a just man is happier than that of an unjust 
man. Each part of the soul of a just man is doing its own excellent activity - epitedeuma: 
the wisdom of philosophical part of the soul is led by reason, the philosophical part 
seeks knowledge and thinks for the best good of the whole persons; the spiritual part 
of the soul corresponds to the courage and seeks honour and success; the appetitive 
part of soul is directed to pleasure and satisfactions, desires material gains and physical 
pleasure. Epitedeuma can be compared to ergon - a characteristic function of a thing 
that determines its end - telos. Telos and ergon determine the chief good for human - 
the telos as a final cause of a thing refers to the final good of that thing. In Nicomachean 
Ethics Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of telos - one that concerns things beyond the 
activities for itself, and the other concerning for activities themselves for their own sake. 
The activity for its own sake is a life with no further end. A life of virtue for Aristotle 
is such a life that constitutes chief human good - eudaimonia. Goodness differs; it
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depends on ergon - the main function of man: the end of a sculptor is sculpting; the end 
of a flute player is to play the flute excellently.
Both Plato and Aristotle agree in the position that friendship develops between 
humans of an equal kind of souls or between souls with the same ergon and telos. 
Aristotle characterizes friendship as “a single soul dwelling in two bodies”; he shows 
correlations between utility that is directed to utility, pleasure that is directed to 
pleasure, and goodness that is directed to goodness. Aristotle writes that human 
exhibits nutritive capacities for reproductive and metabolic processes; it is similar 
to the appetitive part of soul in Plato’s philosophy; perceptive capacities resound 
with the spiritual part of the soul, and rational capacities determine thinking, 
understanding and knowing. Rational activity distinguishes human from all other 
animals, and good life is lived with excellent rational activity. In accordance with 
Aristotle good life requires not only excellent rational activity, but also excellent 
activity of reproductive and perceptive capacities. Any excellent activities - rational, 
reproductive or perceptive - are kinds of epitedeuma. Emotions and desires are 
aspects of soul that give responses to what is perceived - if emotions listen to 
reason they belong to reason. In such a case rational activity concerns not only the 
intellectual virtue, but the moral virtue as well. Natural capacities as well as human 
ergon (function), energeia (activities) and telos (the end) determine the kind of life 
and facilitate development of mutual relations between friends. If the energeia of 
two or more humans is of the same kind, then relations between them confirm mutual 
understanding and congenial telos. The highest telos of human life is eudaimonia 
- life of excellent activity. Eudaimonia is the good for the sake of which all other 
goods are chosen. Humans choose such goods as pleasure, beauty and honour both 
for themselves and for the sake of eudaimonia, but eudaimonia is never chosen for 
anything else. Eudaimonia as a complete life that flourishes rational energeia and 
self-sufficiency. However, self-sufficiency cannot be realised in isolation; human 
requires to live in polis that is natural and prior to the individual and makes human 
self-sufficiency possible. In Politics Aristotle writes that anyone who is incapable of 
membership in a community, or who has no need for it because he is self-sufficient, 
is no part of a city, and so is either a beast or a god.
How does the telos of human life concern relations between friends?
A life that in principle does not allow human to actualize natural capacities is a life 
that makes flourishing and good life impossible. The same can be said about relations 
between friends - friendship is possible if friends allow realizing their natural capacities 
and interacting with each other. It concerns all kinds of humans: rational animal, 
political animal, and biological animal. Human as a biological animal requires practical 
necessities - food, drinks, and clothes. In this situation the flourishing of friendship as 
intellectual energeia is absent; the soul of a biological animal seeks cooperation with 
others for survival and satisfactions. Humans, differently from other living bodies, not 
only communicate but also make dialogue using rational speech and concepts. Through
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speech humans clarify what is goodness, the truth and justice, linger in one another’s 
company and converse. Friendship is more referable to intellectual activities and 
rationality than to practical needs. Intellectual energeia determines the highest form of 
friendship as life of excellent rational activity.
Aristotle’s concept of friendship unites private and social characterizing of various 
aspects of human nature - emotional, rational and political. Friendship unites the realm 
of individuality with social activities - being enclosed in both of them humans know 
themselves and others better.
True friendship is directed to others - it opens uniqueness of human’s activities 
and souls. Plato suggests that friendship is an exclusive privilege for the most virtuous 
individuals; it means that rational component of soul thinks and measures what is 
the best and truest overall. Aristotle is in the same position - friendship performs 
rational actions and creates valuable interpersonal relations. Forms of friendship are 
dependent on intentions of soul. Friendship is not given like parts of souls - capability 
of true friendship is a result of self-flourishing, self-education and self-love that is 
directed to others. Need for a friend is directly related to the rational-political nature 
of human. In Lysis Socrates says that no one would choose to live without friends, 
even if he had all the other good things. These philosophical approaches show that 
relations between friends vary from everyday style of life to complicated attentions, 
and friendship comprehends individuality and self-understanding as well as social 
and political experience.
2. Friendship: “a single soul dwelling in two bodies” - “Oh my friends,
there is no friend”
Aristotle’s expression that friendship is “a single soul dwelling in two bodies” 
essentially differs from the slogan “Oh, my friends, there is no friend” that is used in 
philosophies of Montaigne, Nietzsche and Derrida. “Oh, my friends, there is no friend” 
is modified from Diogenes Laertius expression addressed to Aristotle’s philosophy - 
He, who has many friends, does not have friends. These expressions open possibility 
for various interpretations and analysis in context of ancient philosophy as well as of 
contemporary philosophy. Friendship so significant in ancient culture no more plays 
the decisive role in postmodemity where true friendship is of rare occurrence. Aristotle 
and Plato seek true friendship that flourishes in human and gives rational enjoyment. 
Friendship as a self-contained value loses validity today and is subjected to politics and 
economics where pragmatic relations become more popular - there is no friendship 
that Plato and Aristotle believed and wrote about. The slogan “Oh my friends, there 
is no friend!” seems to mean not only that having many friends is impossible by the 
excellence of relations, but also that friendship in the ancient culture took a remarkable 
space and time for flourishing in oneself and the other.
Derrida analyses political consequences of friendship, views concepts of democracy 
and rethinks friendship as a special kind of hospitality. Derrida speaks of politics that
cannot be an object of theory, but a type of experience - something that is given. In 
an interview at The Centre of Modern French Thought Derrida said that as soon as we 
read canonical texts in political theory starting with Plato and Aristotle, we discover 
that friendship plays an organizing role in the definition of justice, and democracy 
even. Derrida quotes many texts of Plato and Aristotle in which friendship is defined 
as essential virtue - the higher friendship is based on virtue and it has nothing to do 
with politics. It is a friendship between two virtuous men. Derrida suggests that the 
friendship grounded on utility and usefulness is political friendship and comes to the 
conclusion that friendship plays an organizing role in the definition of the political 
experience. Derrida seeks for a prevailing canonical model of friendship which 
has been in our culture from the Greeks to the present day. The canonical model of 
friendship that comes from Greece, he sees in democracy and brotherhood. Derrida 
speaks about fraternity as a special kind of brotherhood that is very respectable, but 
raises questions. What is common between fraternity of the deconstructed world and 
friendship in Aristotle’s philosophy? Concepts of friendship, democracy, and politics 
are transformed today. Derrida uses the concept of hospitality that means welcome 
of the Other without asking name and documents - to open house, language, nation, 
culture. Derrida writes about deconstructive conditions that developed after the First 
World War and continue until today - they stimulate hospitality as a special kind of 
unconditional welcoming the Other, as democracy which would be cosmopolitical. 
Cosmopolitan ideas come from the Stoics, who have a concept of the ‘citizen of the 
world’. Christian tradition also calls that we are brothers - sons of God, we belong to 
the world as citizens of the world. Derrida says that hospitality is that I should try to 
open my space, without trying to include the Other in my space:
Friendship is based on likeness of moral excellence. Plato wrote that the good 
man is a friend to the good man only. Friendship is also modified in accordance with 
social and political situations. Derrida writes about a special kind of friendship - 
hospitality (welcoming without asking) that developed in the 20th century and was 
not topical in ancient times. Likeness characterizes friendship from several points 
of view: 1) likeness in characterization of human soul - Aristotle’s division of soul 
in vegetative, sensitive and rational refers to Plato’s division of soul in rational, 
spiritual and appetitive; 2) likeness between soul and the kind of friendship - the 
dominant part of soul determines the corresponding kind of friendship; 3) likeness 
between politics and friendship - sociality and politics modify kinds of friendship 
in accordance with the current political situation - relations between friends form 
politics, and politics is given experience for friendship; 4) likeness between the 
opposites - friendship is possible between an opposite human as well, but it means 
that the same part of soul (appetitive, spiritual or rational) is dominant for all of 
them; 5) likeness between self-love that is directed to others and the mutual response. 
In any case true friendship embraces fragility and requires empathy, equality and 
mutual responsibility.
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